The destruction of the Nova Kakhovka Dam in June 2023 has had profound environmental consequences for the Dnipro River region and Ukraine as a whole. Here we examine the history of the dam, the rationale behind its destruction, the environmental impact as detailed in the study by Shumilova et al. published in Science on 13 March 2025, and the prospects for environmental recovery and reconstruction both of the dam in the southwest Dnipro region as well as the costs of environmental cleanup elsewhere in Ukraine as a consequence of the second Russian invasion of Ukraine.
History and Strategic Importance of the Nova Kakhovka Dam
Constructed in 1956, the Nova Kakhovka Dam was a pivotal infrastructure project on the Dnipro River in southern Ukraine. It created the Kakhovka Reservoir, which, at 18 cubic kilometres, was the largest by volume in Europe, covering a surface area of 2,092 square kilometres. The dam served multiple purposes: generating hydroelectric power (a large hydroelectric power plant constructed there, that thereby ceased operations in June 2023), providing irrigation for croplands in southern Ukraine and northern Crimea, and supplying cooling water to the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, whose current status remains uncertain and in jeopardy. It was also the major road artery across the Dnipro river southwest of Zaporizhzhia, forming part of the main road, the P47, from northern Kherson that used to run from Kherson city east, then south over the dam, towards Crimea. The P47 in turn meets the M14 at Petropavlivka (now in the Russian-occupied Kherson region), that leads towards occupied Melitopol and occupied Donetsk.
Given Soviet opacity about accounting and expenditure, it is impossible even to estimate how much it originally cost to build the Nova Kakhovka Dam and associated hydroelectric power plant; but it was a major Soviet infrastructure investment to allow economic development of the Kherson region and Crimea.
The other road from Kherson city to Crimea and Donetsk was the M14 itself, which crossed the Antonivka bridge, just east of Kherson, and was destroyed by the Russian Armed Forces in November 2022 when the Russians evacuated Kherson city, much for the same reason as the Nova Kakhovka dam was destroyed, namely to prevent a Ukrainian Armed Forces incursion into the Russian occupied region of Kherson.
Hence in November 2022, following the Russian evacuation of Kherson city, the dam became the last remaining road over the Dnipro River connecting free Ukrainian territory to Russian-occupied areas south of the river. Its destruction was strategically aimed at preventing Ukrainian forces from using the dam to advance and liberate territories south of the Dnipro.
Environmental Impact of the Dam’s Destruction
The collapse of the Nova Kakhovka Dam triggered a severe environmental crisis. The aforementioned study by Shumilova et al. indicated that the dam’s destruction exposed approximately 83,000 tonnes of heavy metals, including lead, cadmium, and nickel, turning the area into a “toxic timebomb” (authors' description). Initially, they estimate, less than 1% of these pollutants were released into the environment. However, the remaining toxins pose a significant threat as they are expected to leach into rivers with rainfall, potentially contaminating water supplies and harming human health.
The environmental ramifications extend beyond heavy metal contamination. The dam’s collapse led to the flooding of vast areas, resulting in habitat destruction, loss of biodiversity, and long-term ecological changes. The disruption of the reservoir has also affected irrigation systems and water supplies for communities and industries downstream.
Prospects for Environmental Recovery and Reconstruction
The question of reconstructing the Nova Kakhovka Dam is complex. Rebuilding the dam could restore its benefits, such as hydroelectric power generation, irrigation, and water supply stabilisation. However, reconstruction would be costly and time-consuming, requiring significant international investment and cooperation. The Nova Kakhovka dam produced 357 Megawatts, not making it a very large dam by contemporary standards; but a starting estimate for construction of such a dam from scratch by contemporary measures might be US$110 billion+. However this is probably a grossly excessive estimate, given that of the 3.2 kilometres long dam the part destroyed was only 85m, entailing that the proportion of the dam that would need to be reconstructed is less than 3%. So we might be looking at costs of less than US$3.5 billion. However costs might be driven up by the remote location of the dam and the poor infrastructure in the area and in particular the absence of railway infrastructure in the region.
An alternative approach could involve allowing the area to rewild naturally. Some experts suggest that not rebuilding the dam might enable the ecosystem to recover over time, potentially leading to increased biodiversity and the restoration of natural river dynamics. This approach would require careful management to mitigate the ongoing risks posed by residual pollutants and to support the adaptation of local communities to the new environmental conditions.
The Russians are unlikely to suffer reconstruction of the Antonivka bridge, given its proximity to Kherson city which is currently heavily militarised, unless (as seems necessary) Kherson and the regions to its south are placed in a demilitarised zone and some sort of international oversight is placed over Kherson to prevent a resumption of hostilities. At the time of writing the distance from significant Russian positions (west of Oleshky, in Russian occupied Kherson) are about 8 kilometres (5 miles) and hence well within range of Russian Krasnopol artillery systems (accurate range: 25 kilometres+) and First Person View (FPV) drones, making central Kherson extremely dangerous.
If the Nova Kakhovka dam were to be reconstructed, it would surely have to be undertaken pursuant to an international mandate, potentially using an international mechanism such as a World Bank trust fund, over several years with provision for international civilian control over the dam, reinforced by a light international peacekeeping presence, with a demilitarised zone well over both sides of the dam. It could then become a civilian crossing point between free and occupied Ukraine (and an interim bridge could be constructed in the interim, the dam being two miles wide). Reconstruction of the dam could provide benefits to both free Ukraine and the occupied territories including Crimea, particularly in light of the fact that also in June 2023 the Russian Armed Forces cut off another principal road bridge to Crimea across the Aranbit split, the Chonhar Strait Bridge, making road supplies to Crimea from occupied Ukraine extremely difficult. It seems that the Russians did this to prevent a Ukrainian incursion into Crimea in the event that the Ukrainian Armed Forces liberated territory south of the Dnipro river, something which in the event they were not able to accomplish.
Other environmental destruction and damage caused by the Russian invasion
As the authors in the paper by Shumilova et al. point out, the areas of environmental damage caused by the Russian destruction of dams during the course of their invasions of Ukraine are not confined to the downstream Dnipro area, and the consequences and clean-up costs of these other regions are currently unknown and impossible to calculate pending further studies that would presumably follow a ceasefire agreement, particularly since some of the areas suffering from environmental damage are in wholly occupied Russian territories. A ceasefire agreement ought to make provision for environmental assessments of the damage done and the measures appropriate to remedy it, and again an international trust fund might be the best way of making allowance for these surveys and expenditures.
Conclusions
The destruction of the Nova Kakhovka Dam and other dams has resulted in significant environmental damage, with long-term implications for the Dnipro River region and Ukraine. Addressing this crisis requires a comprehensive strategy that includes environmental remediation, consideration of reconstruction versus natural recovery, and robust international support. The path forward must balance ecological restoration with the socio-economic needs of the affected communities, ensuring a sustainable and resilient future for the region.
A comprehensive ceasefire agreement would surely include provisions for future measures to remedy this damage and reinstate at least one of the principal arteries for civilian traffic between free Ukraine and Russian-occupied Ukraine. All this could be done without Ukraine recognising the purported annexation by Russia of the occupied parts of Ukraine, and this sort of cooperation might lead to final resolution of the Ukraine conflict in the future, along the internationally recognised borders of Ukraine, easier to achieve. The more cooperation between Ukraine and Russia that can be accommodated in a ceasefire agreement, the greater the prospects for long-term peace in the region are.