Sanctions have long been used as a tool to pressure nations into altering their policies, particularly in times of war. On 13 March 2025, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessant stated in an interview with CNBC that economic pressure on Russia could be escalated significantly. He compared sanctions to a scale from 0 to 10, suggesting that the Biden administration had initially imposed sanctions at level 3, increased them to level 6, and that the Trump administration was prepared to escalate them to level 10. This raises key questions about the effectiveness of sanctions in ending conflicts, with particular focus on historical precedents and the specific challenges posed by Russia’s geopolitical situation.
The Evolution of Sanctions Against Russia
Under the Biden administration, initial sanctions against Russia, which Bessant referred to as level 3, targeted financial institutions, oligarchs, and key sectors such as defence and technology. These sanctions aimed to restrict Russia’s access to Western capital and technology but stopped short of crippling the country’s primary economic engine—its energy exports.
As the war in Ukraine continued, sanctions intensified to what Bessant called level 6. This included additional banking restrictions, price caps on Russian oil, and a ban on imports of key commodities. The European Union and the G7 nations worked to limit Russia’s ability to use the international financial system for oil transactions, while companies and nations were pressured to cease business with Russia. However, Russia managed to circumvent these restrictions by redirecting exports to China, India, and other non-aligned states, demonstrating the difficulty of enforcing sanctions effectively.
Bessant’s reference to level 10 sanctions implies a scenario where Russia would be almost entirely cut off from global markets, with measures such as secondary sanctions on nations that continue trading with Russia, a full blockade of Russian energy exports, and potential naval enforcement of sanctions. The feasibility of such measures and their impact on Russia’s wartime economy require analysis in light of historical precedents.
Historical Precedents of Wartime Sanctions
Sanctions have been employed with varying degrees of success in past conflicts. In the 1990's, the United Nations imposed comprehensive sanctions on Serbia, which, combined with NATO military intervention, contributed to the end of the Balkan wars. The sanctions led to economic collapse, internal political turmoil, and ultimately the fall of Slobodan Milošević’s regime.
Similarly, economic sanctions against Iran, particularly those targeting her oil exports and banking sector, played a significant role in bringing Tehran to the negotiating table over its nuclear program. While Iran did not abandon its nuclear ambitions entirely, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was reached as a direct result of economic pressure.
However sanctions against larger and more self-sufficient nations have historically been less effective. The British and American naval blockades against Germany in World Wars I and II aimed to strangle the German war economy by cutting off access to food, oil, and raw materials. While these blockades did contribute to war fatigue and economic hardship, they were not solely responsible for Germany’s eventual surrender. Moreover modern Russia is far larger and more resource-rich than wartime Germany, with extensive land borders with non-sanctioning countries through which trade can continue.
Challenges in Enforcing a Full Russian Economic Blockade
Unlike Germany in the World Wars, Russia has extensive land trade routes through neighbouring countries such as China and Kazakhstan, that have not joined Western sanctions. Although transit of hydrocarbons across land borders is much more expensive and involved than transit of hydrocarbons by sea, this complicates the effectiveness of an economic blockade, as Russia can reroute trade away from Europe and the US towards alternative buyers albeit at far greater expense.
One strategy to increase pressure would be a naval blockade against Russia’s "shadow fleet"—a network of older tankers used to circumvent Western restrictions on oil sales. A successful blockade of these vessels in international waters could significantly disrupt Russia’s ability to export hydrocarbons, a vital source of revenue.
Naval Resources Required for an Effective Blockade
Implementing a naval blockade would require a significant deployment of Western military assets. The Russian shadow fleet is estimated to include at least 300 tankers, many operating with forged documents and under flags of convenience. Enforcing a blockade would require:
A substantial fleet of warships: At least 40-50 Western naval vessels, including destroyers, frigates, and patrol boats, to interdict and inspect suspect vessels.
Surveillance and intelligence assets: Satellites, drones, and maritime reconnaissance aircraft to track Russian oil shipments.
Legal authority and coordination: Western nations would need to agree on legal justifications for intercepting vessels, potentially under mandates prescribed by international organisations or within existing sanctions frameworks.
Countries most capable of providing naval assets for such an operation would include the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and NATO allies with significant maritime capabilities such as Canada, Germany, and Italy. However, the political and military risks of direct confrontation with Russian vessels or Chinese-owned ships transporting Russian oil could escalate tensions significantly.
Conclusion: Can Sanctions Alone End Russia’s War in Ukraine?
Historical precedents suggest that sanctions alone rarely end wars but can play a significant role in degrading an adversary’s economic and military capabilities. The case of Serbia in the 1990's shows that comprehensive sanctions, when combined with military and diplomatic pressure, can force an aggressor to negotiate. However, Russia’s economic size, land-based trade routes, and existing relationships with non-Western nations make it far more resilient to sanctions than smaller, more isolated states like Iran or Serbia.
If the US were to impose level 10 sanctions, including a full naval blockade on Russian oil exports, this could deal a serious blow to the Russian economy. However, the implementation of such measures would require significant Western military commitment, coordination, and political will.
Ultimately, sanctions alone may not be sufficient to force Russia to withdraw from Ukraine. A combination of intensified economic measures, continued military assistance to Ukraine (which the Trump administration has briefly paused but since reinstated), and diplomatic efforts will likely be necessary to bring an end to the war. The question remains whether Western nations are prepared to escalate economic pressure to its maximum potential while managing the associated geopolitical risks.