Corruption in Ukraine: A Post-Soviet Legacy and the Struggle for Reform

Since declaring independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine has faced a long and difficult struggle to overcome systemic corruption. This struggle has been deeply shaped by the legacies of Soviet governance, the upheavals of post-communist transition, and the entrenched interests of oligarchs who came to dominate much of Ukraine’s economic and political life. Although meaningful progress has been made—particularly since 2014 and with greater urgency since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022—corruption remains a pervasive challenge. The country’s institutions, particularly the courts and local governments, still suffer from deep dysfunction, and reform is proving difficult in the context of war.

The Soviet Legacy: Dysfunctional Courts and Overregulation

The roots of Ukraine’s corruption problem lie in the institutional structures inherited from the Soviet Union. Under Soviet rule, the court system did not serve to resolve civil or commercial disputes as in Western democracies; rather, it existed largely to affirm the decisions of state prosecutors and impose sentences on criminal defendants. Judges were subordinate to political authority and were not trained to adjudicate the kinds of contractual, regulatory, or property-related issues that are central to a capitalist economy. When Ukraine transitioned to independence, her judiciary was ill-prepared for its new responsibilities, and it struggled to adapt to the needs of a market-based society where businesses had disputes with one another or with the state.

Moreover Soviet governance was marked by rigid centralisation and overregulation of virtually every aspect of public and private life. The collapse of the USSR untethered Ukraine’s administrative apparatus from Moscow, but did not immediately replace it with coherent national structures. In the absence of a functioning private sector—barely understood at the time—bureaucratic positions in bloated state institutions became one of the few sources of stable income. These public roles became rent-seeking opportunities: officials accepted bribes simply to perform the tasks their jobs required, or to accelerate or circumvent the heavy burden of outdated regulations.

Democracy Without a Democratic Culture

In the early years of independence, the idea of democracy was unfamiliar to most Ukrainians. Elections became commercial transactions in which votes were bought, and seats in parliament were purchased outright by individuals seeking political immunity from prosecution—the most valuable privilege of being a member of parliament. The Verkhovna Rada (Ukraine’s parliament) thus became populated by self-interested deputies whose primary focus was protecting personal wealth and influence, not representing constituents or passing legislation to de-regulate the economy or enact free market reforms.

The Rise of the Oligarchs

Perhaps the most damaging legacy of Ukraine’s post-Soviet transition was the voucher privatization process in the 1990s. With the collapse of the Soviet command economy and the hyperinflation that rendered the Ukrainian coupon (post-independence Ukraine's first currency) nearly worthless, citizens were issued vouchers meant to represent ownership shares in state assets. However, with little understanding of market economics, and faced with economic hardship, many people sold their vouchers for food or cash. These vouchers were then consolidated by a handful of Soviet-era managers and insiders who acquired controlling stakes in the most valuable enterprises—mining, energy, manufacturing, and media.

The result was the rise of Ukraine’s oligarchs: a small class of immensely wealthy individuals who controlled vast swathes of the economy and manipulated the political system to preserve their interests. They bought judges, bureaucrats, and even entire political parties. Competing oligarchic clans battled over control of strategic assets, further eroding the rule of law and undermining public institutions. The court system, already weak, was reduced to an instrument of wealth and power.

A Culture of Avoidance

Amid such dysfunction, ordinary Ukrainians learned to avoid interaction with the state as much as possible. A vibrant informal economy emerged, driven by necessity and distrust. Ukrainians often conducted business off the books to avoid bribes and bureaucratic interference. This spirit of entrepreneurship flourished in the shadows, but it further diminished the state’s capacity to collect taxes and function effectively. Corruption was not simply a political issue; it became a way of life.

Post-2014 Reforms: A Turn Toward the West

The 2014 Revolution of Dignity (or "Maidan Revolution"), which followed the ouster of pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych, marked a turning point in Ukraine’s struggle with corruption. Ukraine’s pivot toward the West, and its growing reliance on Western political, financial, and military support, placed pressure on her leaders to clean up public institutions. Western governments and international lenders made anti-corruption measures a condition of continued support, and reforms began—albeit slowly.

One of the central changes was in the visible aspects of public administration. Border guards and police officers—long infamous for demanding cash bribes—came under scrutiny, and measures were introduced to monitor and reform their behaviour. New anti-corruption agencies were established, asset declarations were mandated for officials, and civil society organisations were empowered to monitor public spending.

After 2019: Accelerating Change Under Zelenskyy

When Volodymyr Zelenskyy was elected president in 2019, he brought a reformist message and a broad public mandate. Recognizing that Ukraine’s path toward European Union integration would depend on tackling corruption, Zelenskyy initiated a more aggressive anti-corruption campaign. High-profile officials were dismissed or prosecuted, and efforts were made to clean up sectors that foreigners and investors would interact with—buying property, registering businesses, and paying taxes became less susceptible to bribery or delay.

War and Reform: The Impact of the 2022 Invasion

The full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022 gave new impetus to Ukraine’s anti-corruption drive. Corruption came to be seen not just as an internal problem, but as part of the Russian way of doing things, a corrosive force that undermined national resilience. The centralisation of political power in Zelenskyy’s presidency meant that parliament increasingly functioned as an extension of the executive branch, passing legislation with little resistance. This reduced the opportunities for legislative corruption and curtailed the role of oligarchic influence in national politics—at least temporarily.

However, corruption remains present in significant areas. The civil courts continue to be ineffective, with slow procedures and low public trust. At the local level, especially in regions with looser central oversight, corrupt practices persist. Most critically, the procurement systems of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, now one of the country’s largest economic engines due to wartime mobilisation, have seen repeated allegations of mismanagement and corruption, with overpricing, phantom contracts, and insider deals.

Transparency International's 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which scored 180 countries on a scale from 0 ("highly corrupt") to 100 ("very clean"), gave Ukraine a score of 3: slightly worse than Belarus, at 37, but much better than Russia, at 26.

Conclusion: Corruption Still Endures—But Change Is Possible

Ukraine has made notable progress in combating corruption, especially in public-facing administration and national-level politics. The era in which every encounter with an official involved a bribe is, for many, a thing of the past. It is now possible to buy a house, register a car, open a business, or apply for residency without navigating a corrupt labyrinth. But deep structural problems remain.

To align fully with European standards, Ukraine must implement or continue to pursue the following measures:

1. Judicial reform, including the creation of a truly independent civil court system.

2. Full transparency in defence procurement, with oversight by both civil society and international partners.

3. Anti-corruption reform at the local government level, particularly in decentralised regions.

4. Protection and empowerment of investigative journalism and civil society watchdogs.

5. Digitalisation of public services, reducing human discretion and opportunities for graft.

The major challenge to these reforms is the ongoing war. As long as Ukraine remains in a state of existential conflict, national priorities will be dominated by survival, and oversight will be weakened by the imperatives of rapid response and wartime secrecy. But even amid these difficulties, Ukraine has shown that determined leadership, civil society pressure, and external support can produce real change.

The journey toward becoming a fully transparent, democratic European state is far from complete—but Ukraine is further along that path today than at any time in its post-Soviet history.